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ABSTRACT. In this article, we attempt to synthesize the findings of the branch of behavioral eco-
nomics known as “picoeconomics” (developed by George Ainslie) with insights from Foucauldian 
thought in order to demonstrate that a richer and more nuanced understanding of strategies for 
self-managing human irrationality can be achieved when both approaches are mobilized. Picoeco-
nomic games can be modeled as an intrapsychic exercise of the disciplinary power thereby sug-
gesting an important contributing factor to the formation of effective Ainslean will. On the other 
hand, picoenomic descriptions of the functioning of mind do not only align with Foucault’s con-
cept of the “techniques of the self” but also point to the possibility of the transformation of discipli-
nary practices into modes of subjectivation once the former are fully internalized. On the basis of 
these findings, we propose an empirically testable hypothesis about the biographical correlates of 
strong Ainslean will and a prospective area of subjectivity research in the vein of Foucauldian 
studies.    
Keywords: picoeconomics, discipline, disciplinary power, techniques of the self, Foucault, Ainslie, 
hyperbolic discounting 
INTRODUCTION 
The following is an exercise in Foucauldian critique and a sidenote to several of his works. 
The authors endeavor to demonstrate how the current understanding of human irration-
ality and strategies of dealing with it can be enriched by the explanatory potential of the 
concepts of “techniques of the self” and “disciplinary power.” Another crucial component 
of the argument presented hereby is the methodological framework of picoeconomics de-
veloped by behavioral economist George Ainslie and his followers. The authors believe 
that the bridging of these fields of inquiry has significant cumulative potential and will 
prove beneficial for Foucauldian and Ainslean thought alike. 
From the perspective of Foucault studies, such bridging allows to outline the missing 
link between the domains of Foucauldian thought the author referred to in the 
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introduction to the second volume of The History of Sexuality. That is to say, our demon-
stration aims to show that the fold between the “the games of truth (jeux de vérité) […], as 
exemplified by certain empirical sciences in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and 
[…] their interaction with power relations, as exemplified by punitive practices” on the 
one hand and the “the games of truth in the relationship of self with self and the forming 
of oneself as a subject”1 on the other is an area of intensive exchanges and appropriations 
and that power relations, once internalized by subjects, may transform into modes of sub-
jection. 
From the vantage point of picoeconomics, our epistemological intervention bears the 
prospects of establishing causal links between the biographical backgrounds of individu-
als and their ability to exercise Ainslean willpower. If the hypothesis presented in the 
current paper is to withstand empirical testing, new discipline-based interventions for 
treatment of addictions and other self-defeating behaviors may be designed and imple-
mented into clinical practice. Trials specifically devised to test the predictions of our re-
construction would allow to measure the hypothesized effect sizes and specify conditions 
under which they can be observed. 
PRUDENT PIGEONS AND SMOKING ANGELS:  
A VERY SHORT HISTORY OF PICOECONOMICS   
Human irrationality still remains a puzzle despite recent advances in the field. Even the 
appearance of such groundbreaking studies as the celebrated work of Kahneman and 
Tversky2 did not help to completely dissolve the problem of self-defeating and inherently 
inconsistent behaviors in economics or psychology, and even less so in philosophy. One 
of the promising theoretical approaches in this regard is the branch of behavioral econom-
ics known as picoeconomics. 
Developed by George Ainslie on the basis of earlier studies by Richard Herrnstein as 
well as his own theoretical and experimental work, picoeconomics describes the dynamics 
of individual choice in terms of cooperative game theory and envisions the self as a “mar-
ketplace of choice” – an arena for struggle between interests attempting to determine hu-
man behavior. Despite the apparent counterintuitiveness of this scheme, it proved to be 
valuable in explaining some forms of economic behavior3  and the psychological mecha-
nisms of addiction, with Ainslie being credited as “a leading theorist and researcher on 
addictions.”4 
 
1 Michel Foucault, The Use of Pleasure: Volume 2 of the History of Sexuality [1984] (1990), trans. Robert Hurley, 6. 
2  Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow (2013). 
3 Nava Ashraf, Dean Karlan and Wesley Yin, “Tying Odysseus to the Mast: Evidence from a Commitment 
Savings Product in the Philippines,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 121:2 (2006), 635-672; Michal Bauer, 
Julie Chytilová and Jonathan Morduch, “Behavioral Foundations of Microcredit: Experimental and Survey 
Evidence from Rural India,” The American Economic Review 102:2 (2012), 1118-1139; David Laibson, “Golden 
Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting,” Quarterly Journal of Economics 112:2 (1997), 443-477. 
4  Stephen Morse, “Addiction, Genetics, and Criminal Responsibility,” Law and Contemporary Problems 69:1/2 
(2006), 184. 
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Despite the importance of earlier contributions, the history of picoeconomics can be 
traced back to one specific box. Or, to use the author`s description “a sound-proof cham-
ber that measured 30 by 32 by 33 cm” with “white noise piped into” it “to mask environ-
mental sounds.”5 The box contained White Carneaux pigeons presented with the task to 
peck the key implanted in one of the walls of the apparatus. The animals were taught that 
a peck at the key while it was lit red gave them immediate access to a small amount of 
grain. If they did not peck it while it was red, the pigeons would get access to a thrice 
larger amount of grain in 15 seconds. Most subjects preferred smaller sooner rewards (SS) 
to the larger later (LL) ones on more than 95% percent of trials.6 There was another option, 
though. If a bird pecked the key while it was lit green early in the experiment, it prevented 
the appearance of the red light. In this case, the animals deprived themselves of the possi-
bility of access to SS reward in the experiment thus safeguarding the attainment of the LL 
one at the end of the test.  
Only three pigeons out of ten tested mastered this forestalling technique. Yet, the ones 
that succeeded pecked the green key “between 50% and 90% of trials.”7 Thus, two im-
portant patterns of behavior were experimentally demonstrated. First, the preference con-
flict: the same animals seemed to behave differently depending on how temporarily close 
the food reward was. They preferred SS to LL amount of grain when the former was im-
mediately available but LL to SS ones when they could make choices in advance. Second, 
the commitment intervention: the pigeons whose cognitive capacities allowed to grasp the 
mechanism behind the pecking of the green-lit key chose this option to outplay their future 
selves and limit the range of choices available to them. 
Later experiments with similar results were conducted on rats and other animals. As 
of 1989, “every organism so far studied” had also demonstrated preference reversal.8 Tests 
were even conducted on that inconvenient beast that behaviorist theories are notoriously 
reluctant to work with – homo sapiens. Thus, in a 2002 study, Ariely and Vertenbroch 
discovered that 73% of students in their research sample preferred to impose a series of 
deadlines on themselves in order to prevent procrastination and last-minute processing 
of the assigned tasks.9 In a 2007 experiment, McClure and his co-authors observed a mo-
tivational conflict in human subjects choosing between different quantities of juice and 
water available at varying delays that was traceable all the way back to the activation of 
specific regions of their brains.10 And in a 2010 study conducted by Hofmeyr, Ainslie, 
Charlton, and Ross, undergraduates exhibited conflict between the preference for smaller 
monetary rewards delivered sooner and larger ones available after a larger delay (one day 
 
5  George Ainslie, "Impulse Control in Pigeons," Journal of The Experimental Analysis of Behavior 21:3 (1974), 
486. 
6  Ibid., 485.  
7 Ainslie, "Impulse Control in Pigeons," 488. 
8 George Ainslie, “Freud and Picoeconomics,” Behaviorism 17:1 (1989), 14. 
9 Cited in Katherine Milkman, Todd Rogers and Max Bazerman, “Harnessing Our Inner Angels and Demons: 
What We Have Learned about Want/Should Conflicts and How That Knowledge Can Help Us Reduce Short-
Sighted Decision Making,” Perspectives on Psychological Science 3:4 (2008), 333. 
10 Samuel McClure, Keith Ericson, David Laibson, George Loewenstein and Jonathan Cohen, “Time Dis-
counting for Primary Rewards,” The Journal of Neuroscience 27:21 (2007), 5796-5804. 
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versus ten days respectively). Interestingly, regular smokers within the sample were sig-
nificantly more likely to shift from choosing SS to choosing LL rewards when introduced 
to the idea that their current choice may influence the outcomes of similar choices in the 
entire series of trials, as the experiment involved a prolonged sequence of analogous de-
cisions.11 
The appearance of smokers in the last study is not accidental. The manifested type of 
behavior discussed up to this point is by no means new to the scholars of the human psy-
che. The self-defeating actions of individuals or the complicated schemes in which they 
engage to outplay their future selves are familiar to economists and philosophers as “the 
Odysseus problem.” The title refers to the famous episode from Homer`s Odyssey in which 
the ship of the Trojan war hero sails near the island of sirens. The magic songs of these 
bird-women are powerful enough to lure any sailor into the rocks, so the cunning Odys-
seus (with a little help from Circe) devises an ingenious way to circumvent the threat. He 
orders his sailors to seal their ears with wax so they may continue to steer the ship undis-
turbed. As for himself, he orders the crew to tie him to the mast and to not loosen the rope 
under any circumstances, so he would both remain alive and hear the sirens` warbles.  
The behavior of Odysseus is completely, even ideally rational, but the real-life phe-
nomena this story is used to model are anything but. Why do people invest their money 
in illiquid assets, thus rendering their funds unavailable to themselves in the future? Why 
do they succumb to overeating and other self-harming actions even though they know 
about the negative consequences and do not desire them? Why, to use the example per-
haps painfully familiar to any reader of this article, do we first set alarm clocks at early 
hours in the morning and then put them at the opposite side of the room in order to de-
prive ourselves of the option to instantly turn them off and continue sleeping the next 
morning? Finally, the behavior of the addicts can be viewed as the epitome of the self-
contradictory Odysseus-like actions. How many breeds of sirens should nest inside the 
head of an individual to make her grow addicted to a certain substance, then willingly 
enroll into a rehabilitation program and subsequently start smuggling the drug inside the 
rehab facility?  
Classic economics has little to answer to these questions. The rational actor should never 
reverse her preferences unless new information became available; not to mention the fact 
that she should never willingly limit the range of choices and resources available to her.12 
Generally, economists assume that individuals discount their future rewards exponen-
tially, with the value of the item steadily decreasing as the time elapses (Figure I). The 
array of observations gathered throughout the preceding decades (including but not 
 
11 Andre Hofmeyr, George Ainslie, Richard Charlton and Don Ross, “The relationship between addiction and 
reward bundling: an experiment comparing smokers and non-smokers,” Addiction 106 (2010), 402-409. 
12 The only possible exception to this rule in traditional rational choice theory is the situation in which the 
actor precommits to the unfavorable outcome of the interaction in order to coerce her opponent into changing 
the latter`s strategy of behavior. The throwing of the steering wheel outside the car`s window in the 
“chicken” game is a classical game-theoretic example. However, the application of this model to the Odys-
seus problem is incompatible with a conventional view of the human agent as a unitary entity with a con-
sistent set of preferences.  
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limited to the ones cited above), however, paints a rather different picture. The rewards 
seem to be discounted hyperbolically along the time axis, forming two distinct regions. In 
the first of which (when the SS item is immediately available), the preference for SS grat-
ification dominates the preference for LL gratification, while in the second (when both 
items are sufficiently delayed), the LL becomes more desirable (Figure II). In formal terms, 
this means that reward functions from different valuables available at different intervals 
in the future intersect, creating self-contradicting preferences and urging an individual to 
turn to various forestalling techniques to steer her own future actions around the irresist-
ible attractiveness of the immediate gratification.13 Although the assumptions of this 
model are rather modest and rooted in empirical observations, its implications are pro-
found and far-reaching.  
Ainslie argues that the existence of hyperbolic discount curves (Figure II) demands the 
introduction of the radically different model of human decision behavior. The self should 
be envisioned not as an overarching unitary structure but as the space of negotiation be-
tween interests – the “marketplace of choice.”14 The entities that compete in this space are 
called interests  
since they are constituted within the person much like interests within the legislature: 
non-dominant interests maintain their integrity and some degree of power insofar as 
they are likely to become dominant in the future.15  
 
 
 
 
13 George Ainslie, Breakdown of Will (2001), 27-47. 
14 Ibid., 47.  
15 Ainslie, “Freud and Picoeconomics,” 14. 
Figure I. From Ainslie’s Breakdown of Will, p. 32. 
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These sub-agents employ various tactics to dominate the behavior of the person as a 
whole, but if the tactics of the short-term interests are relatively straightforward – just wait 
until the appropriately salient reward will be in sight and seize it without letting the real-
ization of the long-term consequences interfere – what possible mechanism can long-term 
interests employ to secure the success of such projects as sexual or dietary abstinence, 
regular physical exercise, or any undertaking requiring the prolonged series of behavioral 
investments? 
The answers are plentiful, and they will be discussed in the following section, but one 
important method needs to be addressed immediately. The dilemma an individual faces 
in the situation where she, say, wants to quit smoking is the one known to game theory 
research as the tragedy of the commons. The individual understands that the role of one 
specific cigarette in the success of the enterprise to quit smoking is minuscule at best. After 
all, one smoke never killed anybody, and if she manages to combine savoring this specific 
cigarette with abstaining from addiction in the future, she will win in both gambles. Thus, 
she may let herself give in to the temptation at hand. The problem is that the same rea-
soning is invoked by the concerned interest with every cigarette. Ultimately this may lead 
– and often leads – to disastrous failures. 
Now let us assume, as John Monterosso did in his beautifully crafted thought experi-
ment16, that an angel appeared to the lady thus tormented with a choice to light or not 
light her cigarette and whispered that, regardless of her decision, she is destined never to 
smoke again from tomorrow on. Of course, she, as a rational actor, would then proceed 
to ask an angel for a lighter, as far as her current choice cannot affect the general outcome 
of the whole undertaking. She would react similarly if the angel was to tell her that from 
 
16 Cited in George Ainslie, “The Effect of Hyperbolic Discounting on Personal Choices,” Speech, Annual 
Convention of the American Psychological Association. 
Figure II. From Ainslie’s Breakdown of Will, p. 32. 
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tomorrow she is destined to smoke until her (probably not so distant) death. Once again, 
the smoking of that concrete cigarette would have no significance per se if it was divorced 
from the long-term end to which it paved a path. 
This fable suggests the means by which long-term interests can counteract the awe-
some power of the short-term ones. They should define the choice at hand – this specific 
cigarette, this specific training at a gym, this specific opportunity to cheat – as the predic-
tor of all future choices of the similar kind. Then with every smoke the individual will 
stake not the presence of five minutes of nicotine intoxication against the future years of 
abstinence, but the perspective of smoking until her last days against the perspective of 
quitting the bad habit altogether. The ability to cast individual choices in such terms and 
stick to the accepted strategies is called will power.17 Ainslean theory predicts that people 
suffering from chronic addictions will be less prone to conceptualizing their decisions-at-
hand as predictors of the whole series of future choices, i.e., will have weaker long-term 
interests forestalling machinery than the rest of the population. This effect was already 
observed in the laboratory – in the 2010 experiment referred to earlier in this section, the 
behavior of the chronic smokers was more profoundly affected by the suggestion that 
their current choice may influence the whole series of choices they were making than the 
behavior of non-substance-addicted subjects.18 In other words, Ainslean theory does what 
any good theory is supposed to do – it predicts the results of empirical trials.  
THE MICROECONOMICS OF THE SELF 
What follows, Ainslie claims, is economics. The transactions between sub-personal inter-
ests may be studied by methods developed in game theory and behavioral economics, 
hence the proposed name of the field – picoeconomics, or “micromicroeconomics.”19 
Through the prism of Ainslean modeling, self-defeating behaviors of an individual may 
be read as the results of repetitive strategic interactions between rational agents that com-
prise her mind. Ainslie even proposes a classification of the “zones of temporary prefer-
ence durations” (i.e., types of interests) that vie for control in the marketplace of choice 
(Figure III). The list includes pains20 that last “fraction of a second,” itches (“seconds”), 
addictions (“hours to days”), compulsions (“months to years”), and “optimal” zones of 
temporary preference which have no cycle or duration and are never recognized as a 
problem.21  
 
 
17 George Ainslie, Breakdown of Will, 90-104. 
18 Hofmeyr et al., “The relationship between addiction and reward bundling: an experiment comparing 
smokers and non-smokers,” 402-409. 
19  Breakdown of Will, 47. 
20 Based on the neurological and experimental evidence, Ainslie views pains (Breakdown of Will, 54-58) and 
emotions (ibid., 65-67) as sub-conscious volitional processes that compete for the attention of the individual 
and, therefore, can also be viewed as interests in picoeconomic terms. Although interesting, this assumption 
is too strong in view of the present authors. All propositions expressed in this article do not depend on the 
accurateness of this maximalist view of picoeconomics, even though they do not contradict it.   
21 Ibid., 64. 
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Figure III. From Ainslie’s Breakdown of Will, p. 64. 
Ainslie and his followers also created impressive catalogs of stratagems that can be 
used in the war of interests. Generally, they fall into four categories.  
Extrapsychic devices mobilize physical or social factors that will render access to temp-
tation practically impossible or connected with inevitable reputational loss.22 In the sim-
plest scenario, an addict may lock a substance supply inside a safe and throw a key into a 
river. Alternatively, a person may put her “reputation in a community at stake”23 by as-
suring her relatives, friends or whatever reference group she chooses that from date x she 
will start losing weight. Failure to act on the promise will result in disappointing the cho-
sen reference group and consequent loss in self-esteem. 
Manipulation of attention. This tactic focuses on combatting temptation through willful 
ignorance. An overeater may choose not to walk through the sections of the department 
store where junk foods are sold or not to watch culinary TV channels while she is on a 
diet. In a more clinically-relevant example, Ainslie describes patients, “who have told of 
“fighting off” panic attacks, dissociative episodes, and even epileptic seizures by vigor-
ously directing their minds away from the feeling that these events were about to occur.”24  
 
22  George Ainslie, “Self Reported Tactics of Impulse Control,” The International Journal of Addictions 22:2 
(1987), 168. 
23 Breakdown of Will, 75. 
24 Breakdown of Will, 76.  
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Preparation of emotion is resorted to when an individual intentionally cultivates emotional re-
sponse that will inhibit the satiation of the unwanted craving. The same process is at work 
when a person teaches herself not to react with disgust to the prescribed medication even 
though it may have an extremely unpleasant taste. Ainslie compares this to the psychoanalytic 
technique of “reversal of affect”25 and quotes similar opinions of the famous thinkers on the 
subject. For instance, David Hume once observed that “Nothing can oppose or retard the im-
pulse of passion but a contrary impulse.”26  
Personal rules are the most popular tactic, and they are at the center of Ainslie`s argu-
mentation. They naturally follow from Monterosso`s angel thought experiment. If each 
specific choice in itself can be reasoned to be irrelevant to the achievement of an overarch-
ing goal (of becoming slimmer, or not cheating in the relationship, or quitting drinking), 
then the long-term interests can counteract this dangerous and potentially defeating mode 
of reasoning by staking the success of the whole project on the choice at hand: if I drink 
this glass of whiskey I will drink every other glass of whiskey that will end up in my hand 
and I will never overcome my drinking problem. The current choice should be viewed as a 
precedent for all future similar choices according to the personal rule.27 This, of course, leaves a 
huge field for machinations and ad hoc reasoning with short-term interests attempting to 
define the choice at hand as an exception to the relevant rule (if it is permissible to drink 
on proper occasions what constitutes one?). That is why the battles with oneself can be so 
difficult to win. What may appear as a sufficient excuse at the time when the temptation 
is directly available may, in hindsight, turn out to be simply an excuse, thus rendering the 
whole enterprise of following personal rules a constant dispute of definition and re-defi-
nition.    
Ainslie (as he readily acknowledges) was not the first one to recognize the self-regula-
tory nature of these methods. Loewenstein and O'Donoghue quote a passage from the 
1984 article by Nobel prize laureate Thomas Schelling in which he lists such techniques of 
self-regulation as  
relinquishing authority to someone else; committing, disabling, or removing oneself; 
removing resources; submitting to surveillance; incarcerating oneself; arranging re-
wards/penalties; rescheduling one's life; avoiding precursors; arranging delays; using 
teams; automating behavior; and setting bright line rules.28  
Ainslie also embraces the notion of the “bright line rules” as a tool frequently used in the 
definition wars among interests of varying durations.29 This legal term refers to the con-
ditions or circumstances that can be defined so clearly that they cannot possibly be subject 
to redefinition, so the “crossing” of them should inevitably lead to the imposition of sanc-
tions or penalties. Using the example mentioned earlier, the personal rule “I should drink 
 
25 Ainslie also was first to acknowledge the existence of non-accidental similarities between picoeconomics 
and Freud`s psychoanalysis – see “Freud and Picoeconomics,” 11-19. 
26 Breakdown of Will, 78. 
27 Ibid., 78-85. 
28 George Loewenstein and Ted O’Donoghue, “‘We Can Do This the Easy Way or the Hard Way’: Negative 
Emotions, Self-Regulation, and the Law,” The University of Chicago Law Review 73:1 (2006), 186, note 5. 
29 Breakdown of Will, 94-100.  
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only on proper occasions” does not have distinct bright lines insofar as any event can be 
defined in and out of its reach through ad hoc reasoning. On the other hand, the rule “I 
should never drink” is a bright line in and of itself because there is no negotiable middle 
ground between violating and not violating it.      
The rationale behind all these recommendations is a game-theoretic one. The relations 
between interests in the marketplace of choice are described by Ainslie as a “limited war-
fare” situation30 in the same sense the concept is used by game theory practitioners. More-
over, the current-choice-as-a-precedent mechanism is said to be based on the “self-enforc-
ing contract” solution to the repetitive prisoners` dilemma analyzed by Stahler.31 Yet, 
there is an alternative (or, rather, complementary) way in which relations between sub-
agents inside the picoeconomic self can be conceptualized. They, and this is the central 
argument of the current paper, may be envisioned as an exercise of discipline. 
THE MYSTERY OF TWO VERDICTS: FOUCAULT`S DISCIPLINE THEORY32 
Foucault’s Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison was published in 1975 and used anal-
ysis of the evolution of penitentiary mechanisms to gain insight into the wider logic of the 
functioning of power and objectification in modern societies. The volume assumed the 
form of a scholarly detective. It opened with a vivid four-page description of the execution 
performed on “Damiens the regicide” in Paris on the 2nd of March 1757. According to the 
verdict, the criminal was to be  
taken […] to the Place de Grève, where, on a scaffold that will be erected there, the flesh 
will be torn from his breasts, arms, thighs, and calves with red-hot pincers, his right 
hand, holding the knife with which he committed the said patricide, burnt with sulphur, 
and, on those places where the flesh will be torn away, poured molten lead, boiling oil, 
burning resin, wax and sulphur melted together and then his body drawn and quartered 
by four horses and his limbs and body consumed by fire, reduced to ashes and his ashes 
thrown to the winds.33  
On the same page this account ended, the author reproduced twelve articles from Leon 
Faucher`s “rules for the House of young prisoners in Paris,” written eight decades after 
Damiens` execution. The document is aggressively, hilariously precise in the limitation of 
how much time the prisoners should spend on making their beds in the morning (“At the 
second drum-roll, they must be dressed and make their beds. At the third, they must line 
up and proceed to the chapel for morning prayer”), where their bread rations should be 
 
30  Breakdown of Will, 90. 
31 Ibid., 86; 215, note 27.  
32 The observations presented on the following pages do not constitute the only existing intersection between 
Ainslean and Foucauldian thought. It would be interesting to study the way in which Ainslie`s insights into 
the phenomenon of dissociation disorders (George Ainslie, “The Dangers of Willpower, Including the Exac-
erbation of Addiction and Dissociation,” in Getting Hooked, eds. J. Elster and O. Skog (1999), 65-92) inform 
and are informed in by Foucault`s exploration of “monomaniacs” (Michel Foucault, Istoriya bezumiya v klas-
sicheskuyu epokhu [A History of Madness in the Classical Age; Russian translation; 1961], trans. I. Staf, (1997)).   
33 Cited in Michel Foucault, Discipline & Punish: The Birth of the Prison [1975] (1995), trans. Alan Sheridan, 3. 
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distributed (“At a quarter to six in the summer, a quarter to seven in winter, the prisoners 
go down into the courtyard where they must wash their hands and faces, and receive their 
first ration of bread”), and how much time should be dedicated to the pious reading (“For 
a quarter of an hour one of the prisoners or supervisors reads a passage from some in-
structing or uplifting work”). The contrast between these two verdicts is stupendous and 
question-begging. How did the majestic “ritual play of excessive pains, spectacular brand-
ings in the ritual of the public execution”34 transform into “the attentive ‘malevolence’ that 
turns everything to account”35 in less (or slightly more) than a century? 
First of all, it was not only the world of punishment that underwent a tectonic change. 
The process of judging itself evolved away from the pattern championed by Medieval and 
Renaissance jurists. As the classical age dawned on European society, courts started to 
evaluate  not so much the crimes as the individuals that committed them, putting empha-
sis not on the punishment of the delinquent but on the perspective of transforming him 
and “repairing” his personality. The establishing of motives and emotions that preceded 
or accompanied the wrongdoing alongside the introduction of the concept of affect all 
signified the adoption of the new optics and new penal methodology. The revenge coated 
in the suit of renewing the balance of justice gave way to a “therapeutical” judiciary that 
aimed at the minds of the individuals, not at their bodies, “not only on what they do, but 
also on what they are, will be, may be.”36 Through quoting numerous eighteenth-century 
pamphlets, projects, and treatises, Foucault convincingly demonstrates that the primary 
drive behind this omnipresent movement was not the wish to “humanize” the system of 
punishment and erase its savage and bloodthirsty side but rather the mere objective of 
making it more effective while simultaneously making it more economical. The public 
“theatre of torture” with a power of sovereign looming in its background was simply too 
clumsy and redundant to cater to the needs of a newly formed capitalist society. That is 
why the architects of the emerging penal mechanisms found a new point of impact, a new 
target at which the punishment machine was to act from now on, the soul. “The soul” as 
“the effect and instrument of a political anatomy; the soul” as “the prison of the body.”37 
The rise of several institutions in the eighteenth century allowed to find the most effi-
cient and most elegant technology of reprocessing these “souls.” In the popularly re-
cruited armies, pedagogically innovative schools, and reformed hospitals, the episteme of 
the classical age invented techniques and instruments of exerting power on and extracting 
knowledge from its human subjects.38 The political technology that was born out of these 
findings is called discipline, and the society it allowed to build should be called a discipli-
nary society. The introduction of the universal daily routines and training programs in the 
armies, the emergence of classificatory spatial distribution of pupils in schools, the imple-
mentation of the permanent clinical supervision in hospitals, the omnipresent growth of 
 
34  Foucault, Discipline & Punish, 101.  
35  Ibid., 139. 
36 Ibid., 18. 
37  Ibid., 30.  
38  For the thorough and insightful analysis of the epistemes as systems of knowledge production, see Michel 
Foucault, The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences [1966] (2002). 
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the amount of documentation, the creation of the examination as a near-universal form of 
testing all met to reinvent the existing vector of social control. Discipline allowed to use 
the productive powers of individuals more effectively while simultaneously making them 
more obedient and less likely to protest.  
What was then being formed was a policy of coercions that act upon the body, a calcu-
lated manipulation of its elements, its gestures, its behavior. The human body was en-
tering the machinery of power that explores it, breaks it down and rearranges it. A ‘po-
litical anatomy’, which was also a ‘mechanics of power’, was being born, it defined how 
one may have a hold over others` bodies, not only so that they may do what one wishes, 
but so that they may operate as one wishes, with the techniques, the speed and the effi-
ciency that one determines.39  
The scrupulously detailed regulation of the position in which the pen should be held 
while writing, the prescription of the exact spot at which the view of the soldiers marching 
in the rank ought to be directed, the delineation of what movements are allowable inside 
the factory production line all eventually end up sculpting the souls of the individuals 
even though they are primarily directed at their bodies.  
The fact that political control inside disciplinary systems literally starts at the fingertips 
of its subjects and penetrates the entirety of their being made power overzealous about 
trivialities. Indeed, “discipline is a political anatomy of detail.”40 And the increased sig-
nificance of details brought about the need for them to be constantly seen. In facilitating 
this demand, the architecture of the society in both the most literal and the most arcane 
meaning of this word was remolded. The endlessly transparent and precisely hier-
archized space of the classroom is only the most familiar example: the desks are placed in 
rows so that the placement of the pupil in the specific spot attests his aptitude and the 
level of reliability; the passages between the rows are arranged to facilitate the constant 
supervision by the instructor that can effortlessly pass through them; the very construc-
tion of the tables makes students maximally visible and prevents the formation of con-
cealed regions.  
Behind all these very physical yet very formal structures looms one paradigmatic 
building that was never practically realized but informed and inspired thousands of 
schools, hospitals, and prisons around the world. Jeremy Bentham`s Panopticon. The ideal 
penitentiary that was supposed to put an end to all deficiencies of the prison system by 
the merit of its construction alone. Bentham`s project included the circular arrangement 
of transparent cells (the daylight had to pass through them unobstructed) and an obser-
vation tower in the centre of the circle, inside which the overseer supposedly resided (Fig-
ure IV). The tower contained a complex system of inner seclusions, so that even when the 
change of guards occurred or when there was nobody inside it, the prisoners would have 
no opportunity to establish this. The only thing they would constantly see is the towering 
mass of the supervision point from where every movement of the inmate was possibly 
 
39  Discipline & Punish, 138. 
40  Ibid., 139.  
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observed by the warden ready to impose sanctions. The very realization of such a possibil-
ity was the mechanism that changed the behavior of prisoners. “The Panopticon is a ma-
chine for dissociating the see/being seen dyad”41;  
in short, it arranges things in such a way that the exercise of power is not added from 
the outside, like a rigid, heavy constraint, to the function it invests, but is so subtly pre-
sent in them as to increase their efficiency by itself increasing its own points of contact.42 
 
Figure IV. The plane of the Panopticon prison from Bentham`s treatise. Reproduced in the first 
French edition of Discipline & Punish. 
 
Originally hatched inside disciplinary institutions, mechanisms of discipline came outside 
their walls and flooded the society as a whole, being dispersed throughout its structures 
by police, registration procedures, educational routines, and global changes in the gov-
ernmental policies. Eventually, the primary role ascribed to discipline underwent a prin-
cipal transformation:  
At first, they [the disciplines] were expected to neutralize, to fix useless or disturbed 
populations, to avoid the inconveniences of over-large assemblies; now they were being 
 
41 Ibid., 202.  
42Ibid., 206. 
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asked to play a positive role, for they were becoming able to do so, to increase the pos-
sible utility of individuals.43 
Discipline now is not the ultima ratio of the desperate public order; it is it`s very staple. 
After the ill, the mad, and the immature were disciplined, the whole of society followed 
in their footsteps. 
Foucault described three principal techniques of disciplining power: 
1) Hierarchical observation.44 The subjects of such power are constantly placed under the 
penetrating disciplinary gaze. Indeed, they are “objectified” by its very presence, ren-
dered both visible and manipulatable. Characteristically, in such a scheme of power rela-
tions, the possibility to have respites from observation is a privilege, the access to which 
is available in direct proportion to the importance of the position occupied by an individ-
ual on the power vertical. 
2) Normalizing judgment.45 Discipline establishes the norm that is used as a standard of 
evaluation of the qualities of individuals or even the quality of individuals. It constantly 
produces judgments about the performance of its subjects, their competencies, their nor-
mality. The economy of sanctions and countenances it creates uses the movement along 
the normal-abnormal spectrum as a currency. The individual that successfully performs 
the task is productive, and “reliable” is confirmed as “normal.” The ones that fail are des-
ignated as sub-normal and punished by this designation alone.  
3) The examination:  
the examination is at the center of the procedures that constitute the individual as effect 
and object of power, as effect and object of knowledge. It is the examination which, by 
combining hierarchical surveillance and normalizing judgement, assures the great dis-
ciplinary functions of distribution and classification, maximum extraction of forces and 
time, continuous genetic accumulation, optimum combination of aptitudes and, 
thereby, the fabrication of cellular, organic, genetic and combinatory individuality.46 
Foucault draws the line here. Individuals are fabricated by the knowledge-power system; 
they are shaped by the disciplines and objectified by the social system. The individual 
consciousness for Foucault (as of the time of writing of Discipline & Punish) constitutes the 
horizon beyond which the analysis could not (or, at least, should not) venture. The oper-
ation of discipline inside one’s “soul” is presumed to happen in silence or in the impene-
trable haze.  
TECHNIQUES OF THE SELF 
In 1984, nine years after the emergence of Discipline & Punish, Foucault authored what 
proved to be his last major lifetime publication – the second and third volumes of The 
History of Sexuality series subtitled The Use of Pleasure and The Care of the Self respectively. 
 
43 Discipline & Punish, 210. 
44 Ibid., 170-177. 
45 Discipline & Punish, 177-184. 
46 Ibid., 192.  
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These texts marked a substantial departure from the research program underlying both 
the first volume of the same series and Foucault’s monograph on the genealogy of the 
French penal system. Foucauldian analysis now was not dealing with the institutional and 
discursive practices through which the matrixes of subjectivity were created in the Mod-
ern West. Instead, the author focused on the domain of sexuality to investigate  
those intentional and voluntary actions by which men not only set themselves rules of 
conduct, but also seek to transform themselves, to change themselves in their singular 
being, and to make their life into an oeuvre that carries certain aesthetic values and 
meets certain stylistic criteria. These “arts of existence,” these “techniques of the self”47  
Utilizing Classical Greek (Volume II) and Roman (Volume III) texts, Foucault shed light 
on the existence of the vast body of knowledge preoccupied with devising and testing the 
practices for transforming the constitution of one’s subjectivity at the subject’s own initi-
ative.         
In the introduction to the second volume, he defined his field as “a whole rich and 
complex field of historicity in the way the individual is summoned to recognize himself 
as an ethical subject.”48 To facilitate his analysis, Foucault elaborated four principal com-
ponents of the techniques of the self: 
1) “[T]he determination of the ethical substance; that is, the way in which the individual 
has to constitute this or that part of himself as the prime material of his moral conduct.”49 
The ethical substance represents a fulcrum on which the subject should rely to usher 
change in his mode of existence. 
2) “[T]he mode of subjection; that is, with the way in which the individual establishes his 
relation to the rule and recognizes himself as obliged to put it into practice.”50 In essence, 
this is an answer to the question why a person should obey a certain norm or principle.   
3) the forms of elaboration, of ethical work that one performs on oneself, not only in order 
to bring one's conduct into compliance with a given rule, but to attempt to transform 
oneself into the ethical subject of one's behavior.51  
This component may be identified with ascesis, which the author defines in his essay “Self 
Writing” as “the fashioning of accepted discourses, recognized as true, into rational prin-
ciples of action.”52 
 4)    the telos of the ethical subject: […] a moral conduct that commits an individual, not 
only to other actions always in conformity with values and rules, but to a certain mode 
of being, a mode of being characteristic of the ethical subject53   
 
47 Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, 10-11, emphasis added.  
48  The Use of Pleasure, 32. 
49  Ibid., 26, emphasis in the original. 
50  Ibid., 27, emphasis in the original.  
51  Ibid., emphasis in the original.  
52  Cited in Frederic Gros, “Course Context,” in The Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at the College de France, 
1981-82, ed. F. Gros (2005), 529.  
53  The Use of Pleasure, 27-28, emphasis in the original. 
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Foucault employs this theoretical framework throughout the second and third volumes 
of The History of Sexuality to explore the established paradigms and subtle shifts in the 
understanding of techniques of the self in the Greek and Roman worlds. He works with a 
great variety of texts, ranging from the Platonic corpus to Seneca’s letters, and extracts 
from them a plethora of exercises and principles of conduct purposefully invented for the 
“forming of oneself as a subject.”54 In some cases, these techniques are pronouncedly 
physical, as in the following excerpt from Plutarch,  
One began by whetting the appetite through the practice of some sport; next one placed 
oneself in front of tables laden with the most succulent dishes; then, having gazed on 
these, one left them to the servants and made do with the kind of food that slaves ate55  
In others, they consist of a set of conceptual metaphors and attitudes one has to adopt:  
The subject's relation to himself […] is more like an act of inspection in which the in-
spector aims to evaluate a piece of work, an accomplished task. The word speculator (one 
needs to be a speculator sui) designates this role exactly56 
In The Use of Pleasure and The Care of the Self, Foucault limits his scope only to those tech-
niques that were devised and prescribed by experts in the sphere of care of the self – phi-
losophers – and disseminated among the rest of the population with an express aim of 
accomplishing ethical work upon oneself. He admits that these techniques bear more than 
accidental resemblance to the principles of conduct characteristic for the society at large, 
but leaves this thread unexplored. For instance, in the Classical Greek context  
What one must aim for in the agonistic contest with oneself and in the struggle to control 
the desires was the point where the relationship with oneself would become isomorphic 
with the relationship of domination, hierarchy, and authority that one expected, as a 
man, a free man, to establish over his inferiors57  
Evidently, Foucault conceived of techniques of the self and techniques of disciplinary power as 
two separate domains without any transactions occurring between them. We present a 
different picture below, one in which a kind of osmosis between the two is not only pos-
sible but constantly occurs, as evidenced by Ainslean reconstructions of the processes of 
irrationality control. 
SIRENS IN THE PANOPTICON 
In their analysis of risk-taking behaviors heavily influenced by Ainslean insights, Valerie 
Reyna and Frank Farley state that  
 
54 Ibid., 6.  
55 Cited in Michel Foucault, The Care of the Self: Volume 3 of the History of Sexuality [1984] (1986), trans. Robert 
Hurley, 59.  
56 Foucault, The Care of the Self, 62, after Seneca, emphasis in the original. 
57 The Use of Pleasure, 83. 
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planning ability, future orientation, lack of impulsivity, and delay of gratification have 
each been linked to socially desirable outcomes, such as higher educational attainment 
and lower propensity for risky and antisocial behavior58  
They cite three sources in support of this (rather common sense) observation. Let us take 
a closer look at what is said here, though. The authors postulate that personal character-
istics which are most valued in the psychological portrait of a mature, self-conscious, and 
disciplined individual are also the ones that open the way to the attainment of a higher 
position in society, and decrease the possibility of committing undesirable acts. The per-
fect Ainslean inner negotiator happens to be the ideal Foucauldian disciplinary citizen. 
In another paper that bears strong traces of picoeconomic theoretical influences (the 
author cites the works of Ainslie, Liabson, and Ross), Carsten Hermann-Pillath proposes 
that institutions of the modern capitalist society might mutate the type of agency exhib-
ited by individuals.59  Instead of the inconsistent and compulsive behavior characteristic 
of hyperbolically discounting actors, people acquire the capacity to process the infor-
mation and make actions in the predominantly rational and inherently concerted manner 
(which makes the existence of classical economics as a science possible). The author hy-
pothesizes that 
standard rationality might apply in certain institutional settings […] generally speaking, 
human economic behavior emerges at the interface between institutions and mental 
phenomena.60  
Institutional mechanisms remold human beings into some sort of centaurs made of their 
chaotic “nature” on the one hand and shiny social machines on the other. 
In one of the most famous passages from Discipline & Punish, Foucault urges to discard 
the view of power as merely a repressive and restrictive mechanism that ‘censors,’ ‘ex-
cludes,’ and ‘conceals’.  
In fact, power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals 
of truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this 
production.61  
The individuals manufactured by power should have disciplinary mechanisms internal-
ized deeply in their psyche and absorb them into the core structures (or appropriate them 
as principal practices, for that matter) of their selves. The aim and the endpoint of disci-
plinary society is the individual that disciplines and punishes herself. It is the exercise of 
the discipline over the urges and itches of her own mind that prepares her for inclusion 
 
58 Valerie Reyna and Frank Farley, “Risk and Rationality in Adolescent Decision Making: Implications for 
Theory, Practice, and Public Policy,” Psychological Science in the Public Interest 7:1 (2006), 14. 
59 Carsten Herrmann-Pillath, “Elements of a Neo-Veblenian Theory of the Individual,” Journal of Economic 
Issues 43:1 (2009), 189-214; Ainslie provides a brilliant analysis of the process that allows hyperbolically dis-
counting individuals to behave as if they were exponential discounters in the economic markets and situa-
tions involving money. See Breakdown of Will, 100-104. 
60 Herrmann-Pillath, “Elements of a Neo-Veblenian Theory of the Individual,” 208. 
61 Discipline & Punish, 194. 
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into the mechanisms of modern education, modern healthcare, modern military service, 
modern career making, and modern life in general. Panopticon is a form of the head. 
If this is the case, Ainslean “types of impulse control” should be viewed as extensions 
of the disciplinary tentacles operating inside the mind of the person. Extrapsychic devices, 
manipulation of attention, preparation of emotion, and personal rules should be put on the same 
list as hierarchical observation, normalizing judgment, and the examination. The former set, in 
effect, presents the reflection and the extrapolation of the latter. In terms of Foucault’s 
conceptual architecture, methods of disciplinary power, once they are absorbed by an in-
dividual, become her techniques of the self. That is to say, although they are not neces-
sarily self-conscious, they are certainly self-perpetuated procedures of exerting pressure 
upon oneself.   
Indeed, in order to keep track of the shady transactions in the marketplace of choice, 
the self should constantly examine itself, its line of behavior and driving motives62. It ought 
to produce judgments about the normalcy and desirability of its own ongoing psycholog-
ical processes. It has to constantly observe and categorize the individual in the way an ex-
ternal observer would have. 
In his writings, Ainslie dedicates a lot of attention to what he calls the “dangers” of the 
excessive exercise of willpower. At a certain point, when the behavior of the individual 
over-relies on the observation of personal rules, he may fall prey to the danger of losing 
“authenticity” (a concept borrowed from the vocabulary of Existentialism).  
The existentialists said that authenticity comes from a responsiveness to the immediacy 
of experience, a responsiveness that is lost when people govern themselves according 
to preconceived “cognitive maps”63  
In the earlier paper, he lists other negative side effects caused by the hypertrophy of the 
will.64 First, categories of choice overshadow their individual members, making a person inca-
pable of appreciating the uniqueness and singularity of objects or events. The legalism 
and minuteness of the inner legislature`s bureaucracy drains the vividness and intensity 
of sensual and intellectual experience. Second, rules make lapses disproportionally damaging. 
A former addict that failed to withstand the temptation once is likely to view it as a failure 
of the whole abstinence strategy (rather than an individual lapse) and will likely stop try-
ing to correct his destructive behavior altogether. Third, rules create a motive to distort the 
perception of reality. If a failure to comply has such long-lasting and dramatic consequences, 
the individual has a strong incentive to reshape her vision of reality in order not to notice 
the fact of the lapse. This process may take many forms, starting with complex intellectual 
acrobatics, which allows to safely redefine the bout, and ending with actual split-
 
62 Sometimes the results of such intrapsychic exams can have truly dramatic consequences, “David Premack 
described the example of a father who put off picking up his children in the rain to get a pack of cigarettes, 
and, when he noticed what this meant about his character, gave up smoking on the spot” (George Ainslie, “Free 
Will as Recursive Self-Prediction: Does a Deterministic Mechanism Reduce Responsibility?” in Addiction and 
Responsibility, eds. J. Poland and G. Graham, (2011), 72; emphasis added).  
63 Breakdown of Will, 6. 
64 Ainslie, “The Dangers of Willpower, Including the Exacerbation of Addiction and Dissociation”, 65-92.  
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personality disorders. Fourth, rules need not be in the person's longest-range interest. For in-
stance, the personal rule of being hardworking and dedicating all available time to career 
advancement may pave the way to the cardiology wing in the nearest hospital rather than 
the highest title in the office hierarchy. Ainslie even compares personal rules to that very 
institution which Foucault viewed as an epitome of the disciplinary society, its model, 
and its mode: “The artificiality of personal rules, may make them seem like prisons.”65  
And vice versa. When Foucault attempts to imagine the ultimate punishment in the 
disciplinary model of the penitentiary, something morphologically analogous to the “in-
finite segmentation” methodically carried out on the body of the criminal responsible for 
the unspeakable crime of regicide, he conjures up the following image:  
The ideal point of penality today would be an indefinite discipline: an interrogation 
without end, an investigation that would be extended without limit to a meticulous and 
ever more analytical observation, a judgement that would at the same time be the con-
stitution of a file that was never closed, the calculated leniency of a penalty that would 
be interlaced with the ruthless curiosity of an examination, a procedure that would be 
at the same time the permanent measure of a gap in relation to an inaccessible norm and 
the asymptotic movement that strives to meet in infinity.66   
That is to say, an eternal picoeconomic tribunal.  
THE BIRTH OF PICOECONOMICS 
Foucauldian studies in the genealogy of economic knowledge allow to situate Ainslie’s 
thought in the landscape of the late-twentieth-century science more precisely. During the 
1978-1979 season of lectures at the College de France, Michel Foucault pinpointed an im-
portant epistemological shift in neo-liberal economics that differentiates it from the mode 
of reasoning of classical economists of the Adam Smith type. The expansion of economic 
methodology into the realms which were not traditionally considered as domains suscep-
tible to such analysis (family life, education, and the utility of capital punishment, to use 
the examples discussed by Foucault) became possible due to a crucial reformulation. The 
departure point for Smith and his peers was constituted by an individual endowed with 
an interest which he actively pursued. This specific type of subject was indispensable and 
put limitations on the exercise of governmentality by the sovereign. The inaugural move 
of neo-liberals – especially American “anarcho-liberals” (the Chicago School) – is to dis-
place this subject from the centre of their discipline and substitute it for a procedure, a 
type of calculation, or a form of “conduct”: 
[W]e find the possibility of a generalization of the economic object to any conduct which 
employs limited means to one end among others […] any purposeful conduct which 
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involves, broadly speaking, a strategic choice of means, ways, and instruments: in short, 
the identification of the object of economic analysis with any rational conduct67 
 
Figure V. A sketch from the “Blockheads” series by Vyacheslav Sysoev, the only Soviet dissident artist 
to receive a prison sentence for political cartoonism. Courtesy of Larisa Sysoyeva. 
 
Significantly, this is not an anthropological position but a methodological one. Neo-liber-
als do not identify real-life human subjects with the agents of their analyses and do not 
endeavor to demonstrate that the messy psychological or ontological subject of the human 
sciences does not exist. “We only move over to the side of the subject himself inasmuch 
as […] we can approach it through the angle, the aspect, the kind of network of intelligi-
bility of his behavior as economic behavior.”68 Later on, Foucault mentions in passing that 
this epistemological displacement makes possible the type of behavioral analysis most 
famously represented by the works of Skinner.69 Ainslie and picoeconomists perfectly fit 
into the same disciplinary lineage. 
 
67 Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College de France, 1978-79, trans. Graham Burchell 
(2008), 268-269. 
68 Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics, 252. 
69 Ibid., 270. 
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The metaphor of the marketplace of choice and the Ainslean mode of reasoning in gen-
eral is a product of assigning rational conduct to the psychological drives of the person 
without at any given point considering her as a singular subject. The paradox of picoeco-
nomics – and the reason why it, as we argue, overlooks the existence of the very discipli-
nary mechanisms which are responsible for the large number of the effects it describes – 
is the consequence of the original exile of the subject from the economic field undertaken 
by neo-liberals.   
The scientific project of Ainslie and his followers has as its horizon the aspiration to 
circumscribe the individual subject in its complexity without considering her as a whole-
some unit of agency. Conversely, the universal and singular understanding of the subject 
is the point of application of the classical disciplinary mechanisms analyzed by Foucault. 
Discipline owes its success to such a total perspective. It ties together body and psyche, 
self-image and conduct towards others. It is, after all, the instrument of subjectivation, of 
giving shape to human beings. 
Ainslean picoeconomics is overwhelmingly descriptive. George Ainslie hardly ever 
formulates recipes for self-transformation for his readers. That is why picoeconomics can-
not be considered a technique of the self in strictly Foucauldian terms. Yet, if picoeconomic 
tactics for combating interest reversals are to be viewed through a “self-technical” mode70, 
one is faced with a curious discrepancy that was brought to our attention by Aljosa 
Kravanja, PhD, an independent researcher and translator. The techniques of the self de-
vised by Ancient Greek philosophers on the one hand and picoeconomics considered as 
a technique of the self on the other aim at the creation of different objects. Greeks sought 
“an aesthetics of existence, the purposeful art of a freedom perceived as a power game.”71 
The end point of ascesis is a victorious, virtuous being that mastered his desires. Greek 
techniques of the self presuppose success. Picoeconomics is a lore of effective defeats. It is 
a secret knowledge of the person that constantly fails in her willful efforts but understands 
how to exploit her own weaknesses so that they may eventually occasion a favorable re-
sult. Even in theory she always remains internally split and pitiful. Aesthetics versus ef-
fectiveness. Wholesome being versus satisfactory results. 
In our opinion, this discrepancy can be correlated with a significant parameter that was 
constantly present in the life of the Greek polis but is almost completely lacking from the 
urbanized late capitalist world. That parameter is transparency understood as the impossi-
bility to divorce appearance from achievements. There are three privileged loci in the life of the 
Greek city-state, the performance at which determines the measure of respect and recog-
nition the citizen of the polis commands among his peers. Those loci are his oikos, hoplite 
phalanx, and the agora. The conduct of the adult male on the field of battle, in managing 
 
70 An example of prescriptive picoeconomics can be found in the works of Jon Elster, who, in a number of 
publications (but perhaps most famously in the monograph Ulysses and the Sirens), advocated the use of 
various kinds of self-constraints as a tool for boosting individual or group performance across a variety of 
domains. For instance, in one of his later works, Ulysses Unbound, Elster writes about the beneficial effects of 
constraints in fine arts (240-246), Hays Code era Hollywood films (227-234), and jazz music (246-263), among 
many others.  
71 The Use of Pleasure, 263. 
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his household, and in the city assembly (predominantly as a participant in the decision-
making process or judicial proceedings but also as an athlete) determined the “quality” of 
a citizen and a human being. 
Both phalanx and agora are environments of total mutual visibility in two respects. First, 
everything a person does there becomes immediately known to all others. If a line is 
breached during the battle, the consequences are instantly felt by the entire regiment, and 
usually the person who is responsible is easy to identify. Analogously, the warrior that 
broke the enemy’s phalanx becomes universally known and respected after the battle. Ag-
ora is even more susceptible to simultaneous observation by the entire body of polis citi-
zens since it was specifically constructed for this purpose. Secondly, in these environ-
ments appearance equals achievements. It is impossible to deliver a great legal or political 
speech without simultaneously projecting an aura of authority and inner strength. It is 
impossible to acquire a reputation of the famous warrior if the results of your activity – 
dead or wounded enemies – are not supported by your own demeanor and skill in the 
field of battle.  
Oikos, it must be admitted, is not as radically and irreducibly visible. On the contrary, 
some parts of the household should never be seen by outsiders. However, in Greek 
thought, the economic success of the oikos is frequently construed as dependent on the 
type of singular and wholesome exercise of self-mastery required in war or politics. Thus, 
when Michel Foucault analyzes the recommendations given by the character of Is-
chomachus to his wife in Xenophon’s Oeconomicus, he comments: 
The young wife of Ischomachus asks him directly: what can she do not just to seem 
beautiful but to be beautiful and remain so? And once again, by a logic that may appear 
strange to us, the household and the government of the household will be the crucial 
factor. According to Ischomachus, at any rate, the wife's real beauty is sufficiently guar-
anteed by her household occupations, provided that she goes about them in the right 
way. He explains that by performing her appointed tasks, she will not sit about, huddled 
up like a slave, or remain idle like a coquette. She will stand, she will observe, she will 
supervise, she will go from room to room checking the work that is in progress; standing 
and walking will give her body that certain demeanor, that carriage which in the eyes 
of the Greeks characterized the physique of the free individual (Ischomachus will later 
show that a man becomes vigorous as a soldier and free citizen through his active par-
ticipation in the responsibilities of a taskmaster).72 
Thus, even though the Greek household is not as transparent as the agora or phalanx in 
ancient thought, it is rendered so by the commonly held belief that the quality of its man-
agement has direct and visible repercussions for the appearance and psychological con-
stitution of the individual held responsible for it. Those visible and unfalsifiable signs of 
mastery, appearances inseparable from essences, were the objects that the techniques of 
the self were expected to produce. 
 It is even possible to identify a self-conscious preoccupation with preserving polis as a 
space of total mutual visibility in one of the foundational texts of the Greek philosophical 
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tradition. When Aristotle sets out to delineate the optimal size of his ideal city in Book VII 
of Politics, he takes into account both the size of its agora as a physical space: 
one [polis] that consists of too many [citizens], while it is self-sufficient in the necessities, 
the way a nation is, is still no city-state, since it is not easy for it to have a constitution. 
For who will be the general of its excessively large multitude, and who, unless he has 
the voice of Stentor, will serve as its herald?73 
And the ability of its citizens to evaluate each other’s qualities: 
But in order to decide lawsuits and distribute offices on the basis of merit, each citizen 
must know what sorts of people the other citizens are. For where they do not know this, 
the business of electing officials and deciding lawsuits must go badly, since to act hap-
hazardly is unjust in both these proceedings.74 
With further detalization being beyond the scope of the present paper, we believe that the 
preoccupation with aesthetics and singularity in ancient Greek techniques of the self was a 
corollary of a way of life that centered around the spaces of transparency characterized by 
the profound salience of the personal manner of conduct and factual inseparability of per-
formance and achievement. The striking difference lying in the preoccupation with results 
and effectiveness characteristic of piecoeconomics (considered prescriptively), then, is the 
necessary correlate of the organization of modern urban late capitalist lifestyle. The life-
style that separates the domains of professional performance, political activity, sexual ap-
peal, familial life, and communication with a reference group so thoroughly that any con-
cern with appearance that would remain consistent across these regions of behavior ap-
pears at best redundant and possibly unachievable in principle.  
DISCUSSION AND POSSIBLE APPLICATIONS 
Due to his academic background in behavioral economics and game theory, George 
Ainslie never tackles the question of where picoeconomic will comes from. He treats the 
inner transactions of the successful picoeconomic negotiator as a given, as if the mind of 
the individual was solving itself in a manner a mathematician solves an equation: in the 
vacuum of high abstractions. As we have demonstrated, this is by no means a limitation, 
merely a consequence of the methodology he adopts. However, when dealing with real-
life individuals and devising concrete intervention programs, the question of biographical 
background, which contributes to the increased ability to constrain one’s irrationality, be-
comes impossible to ignore. 
The present analysis suggests that one group of people is particularly likely to be suc-
cessful in the consistent self-application of personal rules. These are the individuals with 
a substantial degree of exposure to the discipline-based institutional environments. If our 
reconstruction is correct, subjects with backgrounds in the armed forces, ballet schools, 
and classical boarding schools – to name just a few institutions most deeply rooted in the 
 
73 Aristotle, Politics, trans. C. D. C. Reeve (1998), 199. Stentor being a Homeric hero with a very loud voice.  
74  Ibid. 
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disciplinary regimens devised throughout the classical age – have a higher likelihood of 
displaying the pattern of behavior characteristic for successful picoeconomic negotiators. 
We propose this as a hypothesis for empirical testing. 
Foucauldian thought also has something to gain from the encounter with picoeconom-
ics. In the second and third volumes of The History of Sexuality75 as well as in the College 
de France lectures, Foucault analytically separates techniques of the self from the kind of 
institutional influences on the constitution of the subjectivity he investigated in his ar-
chaeologies of mental health or penitentiary institutions. He groups under the heading of 
techniques of the self proper only the methods explicitly devised as instruments for self-
transformation. However, his own writings contain numerous indications that the bound-
ary between these domains may be porous. 
For instance, in The Use of Pleasure, Foucault remarks that  
Governing oneself, managing one's estate, and participating in the administration of the 
city were three practices of the same type. Xenophon's Oeconomicus shows the continuity 
and isomorphism between these three "arts," as well as the chronological sequence by 
which they were to be practiced in the life of an individual.76  
In The Care of the Self, when commenting on the techniques of the self prescribed by Epictetus, 
he traces how an everyday economic activity gets appropriated as a matrix for the examina-
tion of one’s own mind:  
he suggests that one exercises on oneself the functions of a "tester of coinage," an "as-
sayer," one of those moneychangers who won't accept any coin without having made 
sure of its worth77  
Two pages later, Foucault draws attention to the conceptualization of one’s relationships 
with oneself through  
the juridical model of possession: one "belongs to himself," one is "his own master" 
(suum fieri, suum esse are expressions that recur often in Seneca); one is answerable only 
to oneself, one is sui juris78  
Finally, in his February 17th 1982 lecture at College de France, he goes as far as to state that 
power relations, governmentality, the government of the self and of others, and the re-
lationship of self to self constitute a chain, a thread, and I think it is around these notions 
that we should be able to connect together the question of politics79 
 
75  The authors were not able to consult the recently published fourth volume of the same series, but judging 
by the extensive review of Confessions of the Flesh conducted by Sverre Raffnsøe, the book’s treatment of the 
techniques of the self follows the pattern established in the second and third volumes (Sverre Raffnsøe, 
“Michel Foucault’s Confessions of the Flesh. The fourth volume of the History of Sexuality,” Foucault Studies 25 
(2018), 393-421).   
76 The Use of Pleasure, 76. 
77 Foucault, The Care of the Self, 63, after Epictetus. 
78 Ibid., 65. 
79 Michel Foucault, The Hermeneutics of the Subject: Lectures at the College de France, 1981-82, trans. Graham 
Burchell (2005), 252.  
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If the relations between the domains of institutional structuring of subjectivity on the one 
hand and self-fashioning of the subjects on the other are so intense, so intricate, and per-
meated by so many connections and exhibit so many isomorphisms, should we not pay 
more attention to the processes occurring in the fold between them? Perhaps a new type 
of study can be envisioned – one that investigates the topological transformations occur-
ring when subjects take routine practices, disciplinary mechanisms, modes of behavior, 
and operative metaphors from their social milieu and convert them into practices of the 
self. We believe the current paper has shown that such studies are not only possible but 
have significant potential in the context of the Foucauldian research tradition and the ar-
chaeology of subjectivity in general. 
CONCLUSIONS        
The authors endeavored to demonstrate that the concepts of discipline in the philosophy 
of Michel Foucault and picoeconomic will in the behavioral economics of George Ainslie 
are structurally homologous. The efficient picoeconomic negotiator can be viewed as a 
psychological extension of the disciplinary individual. The implications of such an equa-
tion are significant for both research traditions. From the point of view of picoeconomics, 
our conceptualization suggests biographical variables that may correlate with increased 
capacity for overruling one’s short-term-interest preferences. From the point of view of 
Foucauldian studies, it offers a new research area in analysis of the origins and application 
of techniques of the self and points to the important locus of transactions between institu-
tionally imposed practices of subjectivation and technologies of self-fashioning. A combi-
nation of studies into these domains might also be extended to the critique of political 
projects of so-called libertarian paternalism which rely on proactive “choice engineering”, 
and are advocated in the writings of Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein,80 among 
many others. Generally, the approach that interrogates concealed institutional influences 
as well as seemingly politically “innocent” psychological predispositions and brings into 
conversation disciplinary and behavioral discourses presents a useful tool for the analysis 
of neo-liberal societies. 
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